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SOCIAL INSURANCE.'
By the common law of England and the United States, an
employee who is injured in the course of his employment has
only a right of action against his employer in tort for negligence.
If he succeeds in proving negligence on the part of the employer,
he recovers damages from the employer for the injury. As all
liability in tort is governed by the fundamental principle that
the proximate, not the remote, cause of the injury is to be considered, the employer is not liable in an action for negligence
when the injury arises from the ordinary risks of the trade, or
when the proximate cause of the injury is the negligence of the
person injured or that of a fellow-employee who is not the
personal agent of the employer.
When industrial organizations were small and compact and
when employees were stationary in their residence and were in
daily personal contact with their employers, this system worked
well. It penalized the employer for his negligence, thus giving
him an interest in being careful; and the relations between the
employer and the employee were usually so friendly that claims
for injuries were adjusted without litigation.
With the development of great industrial concerns, in which
the employees are a shifting body who in many cases never see
their employers, and who deal almost entirely with superintend'The author attended the International Conference on Social Insurance,
held at The Hague, in September, r9o, as a delegate on the part of the
(83)
United States. [Ed.]
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ents and heads of divisions, the common law system has become
impracticable. Its weakness lies in the fact that the employee's
right of action depends upon evidence which is often complicated
so as to involve a great expense of time and money, and that
success of the employee not only involves the employer in a large
and uncertain expense both of litigation and damages, but also
casts a reflection upon him as a careful and conscientious man.
Such suits are frequently prosecuted by unscrupulous lawyers
upon contingent fees, so that the injured person gets but a fraction of any damages which may be allowed him. In such suits
bitter feeling is apt to be aroused on both sides. This bitterness
tends to extend and to set the employees as a class against the
employers.
This antagonism between employer and employee, which results from the application of the common law system under
modern conditions, it has been attempted to cure by statutes
taking away from the employer part or all of the defences which
he would have in an action at common law. The Congress of
the United States has passed laws relating to the District of
Columbia, the territories and the insular countries, substantially
taking away the defence of common-carrier employers where the
injury was the result of the negligence of a fellow-servant and
where it arose out of the ordinary risks of the trade. Congress
has also passed an act substantially taking away these defences
from common-carrier employers in suits brought by employees
who are injured in the operations of interstate commerce.
In May last, the Legislature of the State of New York
passed an act which greatly limited the right of the employer
to interpose the defence that the injury of the employee was
due to the risks of the trade or that it was due to the negligence
of a fellow-employee. The same statute provided for a permissive arrangement whereby employers and employees might agree
on a fixed scale of compensation for injuries occurring in the
course of employment, still reserving to the employee, however,
his common law right of action in case the injury was caused
by failure of the employer to obey any public order or when the
injury arose from the serious or wilful misconduct of the employer.
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In June last, the Legislature of the State of New York
passed another statute with regard to certain employments
which "t declared to be dangerous, prescribing a certain rate of
compensation for injuries arising to employees in such employments. By this statute the right of the employer to interpose
the defence that the injury arose from the risks of the trade or
from the negligence of a fellow-employee of the injured workman
was entirely taken away, and the employer was compelled to pay
compensation at the rate fixed by the statute to all his workmen
injured in whole or in part by failure of himself, or any of his
employees or agents, to exercise due care or to comply with any
law affecting the employment. By this statute, in addition, the
employer, even though in no respect negligent, was charged with
liability to pay the statutory rate of compensation to injured
employees in every case where the injury sustained was in whole
or in part due to "a necessary risk or danger of the employment
or one inherent in the nature thereof." It was, indeed, provided that the employer should not be liable for any injury to a
workman which was caused in whole or in part by "the serious
and wilful misconduct of the workman ;" but this provision seems
merely t6 say that the injury must have been caused by an accident. An injury caused by the serious and wilful misconduct of
the workman can, it would seem, hardly be called an accident.
The effect of this statute is to place the employer, in the trades
declared to be dangerous, substantially in the position of an
insurer, at a fixed rate of compensation, of his employees against
accidents arising in the course of the trade. The statute so enlarges the liability of the employers in the trades declared to be
"dangerous" that it seems it would practically be not worth
while for such an employer to attempt to make any defence if
an accident occurred in his establishment, and that it would be
his best policy to submit to the payment of the statutory compensation in every such case of accident, protecting himself by
re-insurance in an accident insurance corporation.
Recently, as a result of investigation by private societies
of employers and employees and by governmental commissions
of many States and of the Federal Government, it has begun to
be questioned whether statutes taking away or seriously limiting
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the defences of employers in actions of negligence brought by
their employees, and providing for specific compensation for
workmen for accidents, leave the employer subject to a liability
in tort, and whether such statutes do not create a new kind of
liability which is governed by principles different from those
which govern liability in tort.
There may be said to be at present two prevailing opinions.
The first is, that the statutes in question do not create a new
liability but only regulate the old liability. The other is that a
new liability is created, but that the liability is one to which the
employer may properly be subjected by regulations under the
general police power.
A third opinion may, it seems, be held; but at present the
few suggestions which have been made along this line seem never
to have been seriously taken up and considered. This opinion
is, that a new liability is created by the statutes under consideration, and that this liability arises from the exercise of the taxing
power.
That the taxing power is, in one sense, included within the
general police powers of the States is well settled. This is clearly
br.ought out in the case of Noble State Bank v. Haskell, decided
by the Supreme Court of the United States on January 3, 1911,
in which a statute imposing an assessment on State Banks of tile
State to establish a guarantee fund to secure depositors in all
such banks was held to be a valid exercise of the police power
of the State. Nevertheless, it is equally well settled that taxation is a peculiar form of legislation to which some special principles are applied.
The conclusion to be drawn from the decisions relating to
taxation seems to be this: That any statute is to be classified
as a taxing statute which directly requires the payment of money
by a person as a contribution to a public benefit. Under such a
classification, a statute .which imputes liability to a person and
thereby compels payment of money by him, either without reference to any wrong-doing on his part or by imputing wrongdoing where none in fact exists, is either void as a confiscation
of property, or is an exercise of the power of taxation. If done
without reference to any public benefit it is a confiscation; if done
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for the purpose of accomplishing a public benefit and if the public
benefit is of sufficient consequence in proportion to the amount
of money compelled to be paid, it is taxation.
It will perhaps be said that this view is inconsistent with
the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Missouri Pacific Railway Company v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 2o 5 , and
in later cases following that decision. In that case the question
arose whether a State statute rendering railroad corporations of
the State liable to injured employees when the injury occurred
by the negligence of any of the agents or employees of the company, was constitutional. The court thus stated the point at issue: "The supposed hardship and injustice consist in imputing
liability to the company, where no personal wrong or negligence
is chargeable to it or to its directors." The question whether
"the imputed liability" was a tax was not raised. The court held
the "imputed liability" to have been properly imposed upon the
company because of "the hazardous character of the business,"
because the statute "met a particular necessity," because the persons affected were corporations, and because all under the same
circumstances were treated alike. The statute was clearly sustained on the ground of the public benefit which it was expected
would accrue from imposing this "imputed liability" upon railroad corporations.
The "imputed liability" which is imposed upon employers
by employers' liability and workmen's compensation statutes is-a
contingent liability which falls upon them at unexpected times
and in unexpected amounts. They must, in the long run, distribute the imputed liability by insurance and meet it by charging
higher prices or rates. The same result in the protection of the
public can be obtained by the State taxing all the persons who are
made subject to the imputed liability so as to create an insurance
fund, and paying all such "imputed liabilities" out of the fund.
Every "imputed liability" is, therefore, it would seem, essentially an assessment or tax, and the Supreme Court of the United
States, in sustaining State statutes "imputing liability" in cases
where there seems reasonably to be some public benefit arising
from the imputation of the liability, have not ignored the distinction between taxation and other forms of legislation, but
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have left the way open to distinguish between them in any case
where such a distinction may be material.
Statutes which "impute liability" where there is no wrongdoing on the part of the person against whom the liability is
"imputed" are, it would seem, the most dangerous manifestations of the taxing power. Statutes which are openly taxing
statutes state on their face the public objects for which the citizen
is compelled to pay. Statutes which "impute liability" do not, as
a general rule, state the public objects for which the citizen is
compelled to pay. Statutes "imputing liability" are thus frequently taxing statutes in a concealed form, and the courts, in
sustaining them; are obliged to judge for themselves what the
public purposes are for which the money is compelled to be paid.
Everything which the Supreme Court of the United States said
with regard to the power to tax, in the case of Loan Association
v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655. may be said, with redoubled emphasis,
with respect to statutes which "impute liability." The court in
that case said:
"The power to tax is the strongest, the most pervading of
all the powers of government, reaching directly or indirectly to
all classes of the people. * * * The power can as readily
be employed against one class of individuals and in favor of
another, so as to ruin the one class and give unlimited wealth and
prosperity to the other, if there is no implied limitation of the
uses for which the power may be exercised.
"To lay with one hand the power of the government on the
property of the citizen, and with the other to bestow it upon
favored individuals to aid private enterprises and build up private
fortunes, is none the less a robbery because it is done under the
forms of law and is called taxation. This is not taxation. It is a
decree tinder legislative form. * * *
"There can be no lawful tax which is not laid for a public
purpose."

A fortiori, there can, it would seem, be no "imputed liability"
which is not imputed for a public purpose.
Every statute which takes away or seriously limits the defences which an employer would have in an action for negligence
brought by his employee, "imputes liability" to the employer to
the extent that it makes it impossible for him to show that he
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was not a wrong-doer. If the effect of the statute is to make him
liable to compensate his employees for all accidents occurring in
the course of the employment, regardless of his negligence, the
liability is on principle, it would seem, in no way to be differentiated from a tax.
The New York statute relating to workmen's compensation
for accident in dangerous trades, is, it would seem, a clear case
of "imputed liability." It seems probably to be the case that the
risk of the employees in the trades declared by that statute to be
"dangerous" is less than in many other trades. If so, it seems
probable that, in enacting legislation on this subject, the States will
soon find it impracticable to base their statutes upon the dangerous
nature of the occupations, and that we may soon expect to see
statutes which provide for workmen's compensation for industrial
accidents applicable to all trades and employments and to all persons and corporations engaged therein.
The question then is, whether the statutes which practically
compel employers to compensate their workmen for all accidents
arising in the course of employment are based upon a sufficient
public benefit. This involves an examination of the relation of
workmen's compensation for accident to what is called "social insurance," or, to use the expression now established throughout
the continent of Europe. "the social assurances."
The "social assurances," as the term is now used in Europe,
comprise all kinds of plans, involving any degree of governmental
compulsion, by which employees are compensated for or insured
against accidents of labor, against sickness and against invalidism,
whereby laborers are insured against involuntary employment,
whereby pensions or insurance funds are provided for aged
laborers, and even whereby medical service is provided to prevent
and cure diseases of laborers and to promote industrial hygiene.
In all the countries of Europe, workmen's compensation for accidents has proved to be the forerunner of the whole system of
social insurance.
The question arises, why the expression "social insurance"
or "the social assurances" has been adopted. At first sight it
seems difficult to attach a definite meaning to the word "social"
in this connection. The word has, however, been selected with
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great care and deliberation. The German system of workmen's
compensation for accidents through joint contributions made by
the employer, the employee and the State, went into effect in 1884.
By 1889, the system had so developed throughout Europe that
conferences of experts oil the subject began to be held. Such
conferences have been continued at intervals of two or three
years ever since that time, and there has existed for several years
a permanent organization in Europe composed of experts on this
subject, having its headquarters in Paris and having branches
in all parts of the civilized world. The organization in Paris calls
itself "The Permanent International Committee of the Social
Assurances." In September last this association held an international conference at the Hague, which was patronized by the
Netherlands Government. To this international conference
twenty nations sent official delegates, the United States being
represented by five official delegates, headed by the Commissioner of Labor. At the international conference of this association held at Rome in i9o8 the expression "the social assurances"
was definitely adopted by the association to express its purpose
and objects. Before that time the association had used as expressing the objects of its study the terms "accidents of labor,"
"workmen's insurance," and "accidents of labor and the social
assurances." The adoption, in i9o8' of the expression "the social
assurances" evidently signified a general agreement that the subject of workmen's compensation for accidents of labor was a
necessary and essential part of a general scheme of social insurance, and that it could not logically be considered separately.
It will be noticed that all these various forms of compensation, pensions and aid which are included under the term "social.
insurance" have the characteristic in common that they aim to
benefit society at large as well as certain individuals. The individuals to whom the money is paid and for whose benefit contributions are compelled by the State are those who are active producers, or who will be active producers if tided over an emergency, or who have been active producers. The individual is
aided, not as an individual, but as a producing unit of society.
Insurance permits the diffusion of. payments or losses, which
would otherwise fall directly upon individuals, so that they are
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scattered among society at large. Under the German plan,
where the employer, the employee and the State all contribute
to an insurance fund to protect the employee against the consequences of accident, sickness, invalidism, etc., the burden is,
in a very true sense, distributed among society at large. Social
insurance, therefore, seems to be insurance accomplished through
taxation for the benefit of individuals who are productive social
units or who may be or who have been such, and who are protected from the consequences of extreme poverty in order that
they may continue to be active producers or may become active
producers, and may be free from the deadening appreliension of
extreme poverty in old age which so powerfully works against
the efficiency of industrial workers.
Social insurance, may be, and is in fact, used to describe
the action by society, partly through the compulsory method of
taxatioh and partly through the voluntary method of association,
and by means of insurance and re-insurance, to prevent those
wage-earning producers from falling into extreme poverty who
are necessarily so poorly paid that they live always on the verge,
and are in daily danger of falling into the abyss with their wives,
children and dependents. Extreme poverty breeds disease of
body, mind and soul, and by it society itself deteriorates. The
deterioration of wage-earning producers is a double injury to
society, because it not only tends to produce and disseminate
disease, but also withdraws from production workers who might
be efficient productive units. Social insurance is thus the insurance of society by society, or collective self-preservation.
It may be objected that the program of social insurance is unending, and that social insurance is, therefore, but a concealed
form of compulsory re-distribution of wealth.
As respects the first objection, it is the fact that by the
Continental European system, the social assurances are so adjusted
that they apply only to deserving persons who are or have been
active producers and who, if relieved from destitution occurring
without their fault and from the fear of such destitution, will continue to be efficient producers after misfortune or will work more
efficiently until misfortune occurs.
As respects the second objection, the system is not based
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on the assumption that there is a right to an equal distribution of
all property. Inequality of wealth is recognized as a permanent
fact of society, and the impost necessary to accomplish the results desired is so arranged, on the principles of insurance, that
its incidence is or may be shifted by re-insurance so as to fall
upon society at large. The philosophical basis of social insurance
is not, therefore, the equalizing of property, but the equalizing
of the opportunity to live and to earn.
In the opinion of a recent American writer-Professor
Henry Rogers Seager, of Columbia University, in his book on
"Social Insurance",-social insurance is only a part of a still
wider scheme of social reform. He says:
"The program of social reform

*

*

*

consists in pro-

tecting wage-earning families which have developed standards
of living from losing them, and in helping wage-earning families
without standards to gain them. The first end is to be accomplished by making obligatory for wage-earners exposed to industrial accidents, illness, premature death, unemployment, and old
age, adequate plans of insurance against these evils. The second,
by withdrawing from competitive industry the lowest grade of
workers, the tramps and casuals, and giving them the benefit of
industrial training in graded farm and industrial colonies, from
which they shall be graduated only as they prove their ability to
be independent and self supporting."
It seems, however, that social insurance is capable of being
considered separately from the other part of the scheme of social
reform to which Professor Seager refers, and that the two parts
of the scheme stand upon entirely different grounds.
If social insurance be a process by which society insures
itself against deterioration, and the ultimate purpose is to preserve society by preserving the wage-earner from undeserved
misfortune, and if workmen's compensation for industrial accident is but a form of social insurance, it necessarily follows that
the money payments required from employers by statutes providing compensation to workmen for industrial accidents. are
payments required for a p-iblic benefit, and that such statutes, if
otherwise complying with the principles of taxation, may properly
be regarded as an exercise of the taxing power of the State.
It would appear therefore, that the Congress of the United
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States and the State Legislatures, in enacting laws on the subject
of workmen's compensation for industrial accidents, are really
entering upon the whole scheme of social insurance, and that such
statutes are to be sustained, if at all, as an exercise of the power
of taxation, and must therefore be framed so as to comply with
the established principles of taxation.
In all legislation in this country heretofore adopted or proposed, so far as the writer is aware, the Employers' Liability Act
of Great Britain has been taken as the general model. The prim
ciple of that act is that all employers are made liable to compensate persons injured in their employ at a rate fixed by statute.
The result is that all employers must insure themselves in accident
insurance companies so as to lrotect themselves against this contingent liability. In view of the tendency of employees to change
their residences and their places of employment, it is considered
impossible to make an effective arrangement whereby they may
contribute to an insurance fund such as the German Government
provides. Moreover, the German system is objected to as paternal
and as interfering with the liberty of the employer. Out of the
situation as it exists in England and in other countries where the
British system has been adopted, there have arisen gigantic acci(lent insurance corporations, some of them doing business internationally. The contingent liability against which these companies
insure is so great and so uncertain that they must of necessity
charge large fees, and it is a question whether this form of re-insurance is not very expensive.
In the countries of Europe various modifications of the German system exist. Some permit the employer to relieve himself
of liability by re-insurance in certain specified corporations; others
provide an insurance organization under State control in which
the employers may re-insure and thus be relieved of liability. It
is evident that various modifications are possible between the
German and the British systems.
In Great Britain and the countries of Europe, where there
is no Supreme Court to determine upon the constitutionality of
statutes, it is unnecessary to define the exact nature of a governmental power which is exercised in a particular statute. In this
country, where all legislative power is limited by the provisions

SOCIAL INSURANCE

of written constitutions it is necessary that we draw close distinctions in determining questions of constitutionality. But the
fact that we live under written constitutions does not exempt us
from the operation of economic laws, and written constitutions
must be interpreted in the light of economic facts. If it could be
shown that the cases in which the Supreme Court of the United
States has had occasion to consider tile constitutionality of employ-ers' liability laws have established doctrines inconsistent with the
general scheme of social insurance, it would be necessary for that
court to reconsider such doctrines in view of the present tendencies
toward the establishment of such a system. The Court has ruled
upon employers' liability statutes in the following cases: Missouri
Pacific Railroad Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205; Chicago, Kansas
and \Vestern Railroad Co. v. Pontius, 157 U. S. 209; Tullis v. Lake
Erie and Western Railroad, 175 U. S. 348; Employers' Liability
Cases, 207 U. S.463, and El Paso and Northeastern Railway Co.
v. Gutierrez, 215 U. S.87. In none of these cases, however, was
the question raised whether the liability imposed by the statutes
was an exercise of the power of taxation, nor were the statutes
presented to the court as steps in a program of social insurance.
The statutes which have come before the court have been held to
be constitutional in every case except where objections were
raised growing out of the power of the United States to regulate
commerce between the States, and there is nothing to prevent the
court fromn making such rulings upon the subject as it may deem
necessary in view of the present economic conditions.
If it be agreed that such of the "employers' liability" and
"'workmen's compensation" statutes as abolish or seriously limit
the defences which the employer would have in a common law
action for negligence are manifestations of the taxing powers of
Congress and the State Legislatures, it is necessary to consider
what sort of a tax it is which is imposed by these statutes. It would
seem to be a tax of a composite kind. It resembles in some respects an excise, because it is imposed on industry and taken out
of the earnings of business. It resembles somewhat an assessment
whereby an owner of property is obliged to pay towards a public
benefit to the extent that he receives a private benefit. The tax is
indirect, as distinguished from direct, because it is capable of being
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shifted by the person on whom it is imposed, so that it will fall
upon the public or upon society at large.
It may be claimed that the amounts which are compelled
to be paid to workmen as compensation for accidents cannot be regarded as taxes because they are not collected by public taxing
officers and not paid into the public treasury. They are, however,
paid into the treasury of the court and paid out by order of the
court under authority of statute. Undoubtedly this is a new
method. If, however, it should be considered that this method
of exercising the power of taxation is not consistent with our
constitutional law, the difficulty can be met by the taxation of
all employers of labor, or of all employers and employees, or of
the public generally, to establish an insurance fund controlled by
the State.
Regarding the subject of workmen's compensation for accidents as falling within the domain of taxation, there .would
.appear to be some reason for placing the control of the subject
in the Federal Government, and such action would not, it would
seem, necessarily be unconstitutional. The taxing power of
Congress is plenary. The requirement of Article I, Section 8
of the Constitution that "all duties, imposts and excises shall be
uniform throughout the United States," is m€erely a statement of
the economic axiom that all duties, imposts and excises must be
uniform wherever free trade is desired. The effect of a workmen's compensation statute passed by one of the States of the
Union is economically the same in preventing free trade within
the Union, as if that State had imposed an excise tax upon the
industry or industries specified in the statute to the extent of the
liability imposed by the statute. The industry is burdened
exactly as it would be if an excise tax was imposed. If the tax
is not so great but that it can be shifted to the consumer of the
commodity produced by the industry, at the higher price which
the consumer must pay, the employer will be relatively in the
same posiion. If, however, the industry is obliged to meet competition of industries in other States where no such burden is
imposed, the consumer will not pay the extra price, andl the industries of these other States will, by the natural course of competition, drive the burdened industry to tile wall.
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The vast extent of this country, however, gives pause to
those who venture to think of Federal control of social insurance; but if the postal savings banks shall prove a success, it
may be that some combination of a national savings and
insurance plan, with local administration, might be practicable.
At all events, it seems clear that the problem is simplified
if we regard workmen's compensation for accidents as a necessary
and essential part of a general scheme of social insurance, and if
we recognize at the outset that the power which the Congress
and the State Legislatures are exercising when they are attempting to provide workmen's compensation is the taxing
power and not the general police power.
The "International Congress on Industrial Insurance" which
President Taft in his last message recommended to be invited
to be held in the United States in 1913 will be organized by the
association having its headquarters in Paris to which reference
has been made, and which is called the "Permanent International
Committee of the Social Assurances." The object of this congress
will be to discuss the whole program of "the social assurances,"
as that expression is now understood in Europe, and workmen's
compensation for industrial accidents will be regarded by the
congress as one phase of social insurance. It is to be hoped that
in the meantime those who are engaged in preparing legislative
projects for extension of employers' liability and for workmen's
compensation, will examine the subject in the light of European
experience and theory. If social insurance is necessarily involved
in workmen's compensation, and if social insurance is a matter
of such great public benefit as the Europeans evidently believe
it to be, it is, it would seem, a subject which can be provided for
without violation of our constitutional principles, by. taxing, for
social insurance purposes, the employers, the employees, or the
public.
The sole limitation upon the power of taxation, wherever
.it is exercised, as respects the range of its objects, is that which
is expressed in the Constitution of the United Statei,-that it
must be for the common defence or the general welfare. The
ideas of the world at-large change from age to age as to what is
necessary for the common defence or for the general welfare.
Ironclads and airships, undreamed of in one age, are regarded
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as essentials to the common defence in the next. Productive
efficiency of persons able to labor, not dreamed of in one age,
may be regarded as essential to the general welfare in the next.
On the ground of providing for the common defence, the soldier
and sailor are supported altogether, in time of peace, so as to
be prepared in case of war. The temporary support of productive laborers to tide them over emergencies arising without
their fault may reasonably be regarded as essential in the interests of the general welfare. The subject is one which deserves
the fullest consideration from every standpoint, and it is most
desirable that legislation should not be adopted until there is an
agreement upon fundamental principles.
Alpheus H. Snow.
Washington, D. C.

